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Recent advances in Internet of Things (IoT) have enabled myriad domains such as smart homes, personal
monitoring devices, and enhanced manufacturing. IoT is now pervasive—new applications are being used in
nearly every conceivable environment, which leads to the adoption of device-based interaction and automation.
However, IoT has also raised issues about the security and privacy of these digitally augmented spaces. Program
analysis is crucial in identifying those issues, yet the application and scope of program analysis in IoT remains
largely unexplored by the technical community. In this paper, we study privacy and security issues in IoT
that require program-analysis techniques with an emphasis on identified attacks against these systems and
defenses implemented so far. Based on a study of five IoT programming platforms, we identify the key insights
that result from research efforts in both the program analysis and security communities and relate the efficacy
of program-analysis techniques to security and privacy issues. We conclude by studying recent IoT analysis
systems and exploring their implementations. Through these explorations, we highlight key challenges and
opportunities in calibrating for the environments in which IoT systems will be used.
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy→ Software and application security; • Software and its engi-
neering→ Automated static analysis; Dynamic analysis;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: IoT programming platforms, program analysis, IoT security and privacy
1 INTRODUCTION
The introduction of IoT devices into public and private spaces has changed the way we live. For
example, home applications that integrate smart locks, thermostats, switches, surveillance systems,
and appliances allow users to monitor and interact with their living spaces from anywhere. While
industry and users alike have embraced IoT, concerns have been raised about the security and
privacy of digitally augmented spaces [38, 48, 79]. IoT environments necessarily have access to
functions that, if abused, would put user security at risk, e.g., unlock doors when the user is not
at home or create unsafe conditions by turning off the heat in cold weather [24]. In addition,
these networked systems have access to private data that, if leaked, would cause privacy issues,
e.g., information about when the user sleeps or who and when others are at home [22].
Driven by consumer concerns, one of the central criticisms of IoT is that existing platforms
lack the essential tools and services to analyze security and privacy. Such criticisms have not
gone unnoticed. Recent technical community efforts have proposed a range of tools to identify
sensitive data leaks in IoT apps [22, 39], while others have focused on improving IoT safety and
security [24, 55, 95, 101]. Works in this area use program-analysis techniques to design and build
algorithms that identify vulnerabilities and dangerous behavior within a targeted IoT programming
platform. These works motivate our work to study security and privacy issues in IoT that are solved
by program-analysis techniques.
Authors’ addresses: Z. Berkay Celik, Penn State University, zbc102@cse.psu.edu; Earlence Fernandes, University of Washing-
ton, earlence@cs.washington.edu; Eric Pauley, Penn State University, eap5377@psu.edu; Gang Tan, Penn State University,
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2 B. Celik et al.
While thematically similar to program analysis in mobile apps and other domains, from our study
of five major IoT programming platforms (Samsung’s SmartThings, Apple’s HomeKit, OpenHAB,
Amazon AWS IoT, and Android Things), we have found that IoT programming platforms present
unique characteristics and challenges in program analysis when compared to other platforms [22].
First, in the case of Android, a well-defined intermediate representation (IR) is available, and analysis
can directly analyze IR code. However, IoT programming platforms are diverse, and each uses its
own programming language. Second, IoT integrates physical processes with digital connectivity
through a diverse set of devices, each of which has a different set of internal device states (e.g., door
locked/unlocked); thus identifying security and privacy issues through these physical states is quite
subtle. For example, an adversary can break into a home by changing the thermostat temperature
value that causes the windows to open once the temperature reaches a threshold value. Lastly,
each IoT programming platform has its own idiosyncrasies that can pose challenges to program
analysis. For instance, the SmartThings platform allows apps to perform call by reflection and
make web-service requests; each of these features makes program analysis more difficult and
requires special treatment. Due to these domain-specific challenges, ensuring the safety, security,
and privacy of IoT systems is not a trivial endeavor.
In this work, we present security and privacy issues in IoT that motivate program analysis
techniques. We contrast program analysis in IoT with other domains, demonstrating key differences
that complicate analyses. We first study five IoT programming platforms to gain insights into the
structure of their apps. We then present IoT-specific issues that require program-analysis techniques
within an IoT app or multiple-apps colocated in an environment. We focus on areas that prior
research has addressed and others that remain open problems. Lastly, we demonstrate a number of
IoT program idiosyncrasies that require special treatment and present several general precision
requirements for IoT code analysis, by providing examples from IoT apps. We conclude by studying
a representative set of recent IoT analysis systems from literature. Our study serves as a guideline
for researchers and provides insights into the design and implementation of IoT program analysis
for security and privacy. In this work, we explore the following:
• We conduct a study of five major IoT programming platforms to understand their program
structures. We map their program structures to a sensor-computation-actuator idiom that
includes the common building blocks of IoT apps.
• We present IoT-specific issues, IoT program idiosyncrasies and general precision requirements
for IoT app analysis with examples from 230 SmartThings IoT apps. We discuss the problems
that have already started to study by the research community and the areas that need attention.
In highlighting open issues, we draw insights and motivate future work.
• We study six IoT analysis systems from literature for security and privacy that incorporate
program-analysis techniques. We measure their ability to analyze IoT apps and evaluate their
approaches to IoT-specific issues. We note that we limit our analysis to publications that use
program analysis for IoT security and privacy and were published at a major venue.
Scope. This work is at the intersection of three domains: IoT programming platforms, program
analysis, and security and privacy. IoT programming platforms provide a software stack to develop
applications that monitor and control devices. Program analysis includes the techniques used for
analyzing the behavior of an IoT app or multiple-apps in an environment. Security and privacy cover
the objective of the program-analysis techniques to identify potential security and privacy issues.
We begin below by giving an overview of IoT systems and program structures of IoT platforms.
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Fig. 1 An example architecture of edge-based IoT system.
2 BACKGROUND
We start with an overview of how IoT systems structure their design (Section 2.1). We then present
recent research on IoT security and privacy (Section 2.2). As IoT is a diverse domain, we focus on
consumer IoT, which has the largest number of applications and the most significant market [51].
2.1 An Overview of IoT System Architectures
IoT systems integrate physical processes with digital connectivity. These systems are used to
achieve simple tasks such as motion-activated light switches, as well as complex tasks such as
controlling the traffic lights in a smart city. Regardless of their purpose and complexity, IoT systems
often structure their architecture from bottom to top with (1) devices, (2) connectivity protocols,
and (3) IoT programming platforms (See Figure 1). These systems often use an edge device as a
centralized gateway that connects devices in a physical environment, use a cloud back-end to
synchronize device states and provide interfaces for remote control and monitoring of devices.
Devices are equipped with embedded sensors and actuators that interact with a physical envi-
ronment. Sensors collect physical states and send events to other devices, the hub, or the cloud.
These events are processed and used to actuate the devices. For example, a presence sensor detects
a presence event and communicates with a switch (actuator) that turns on the lights. We note
that a mobile phone or even a coffee machine can be a sensor as long as it can gather information
about its environment. Protocols are used to establish communication between heterogeneous
devices and network endpoints. These protocols are selected according to the requirements of the
environment such as low power or non-lossy connection. For instance, the Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) protocol is used for short-range communication and is extremely energy efficient.
IoT programming platforms deliver app-specific services by managing devices and their interac-
tions. They also enable crucial functions such as data collection, control, and interoperability. In
recent years, several IoT programming platforms are emerged in a wide range of domains: Apple’s
HomeKit [12], OpenHAB [42], Samsung’s SmartThings[2] for smart home, Android Sensor API [7],
Google Fit for wearables [43], ThingWorx [94] for aerospace, Eclipse Kura [33] for general-purpose
solutions, and FarmBeats [97] for agriculture. These platforms offer web-based environments and
tools that enable developers to write applications used to create custom automations. Applications
use a diverse set of languages and execute in a variety of environments (e.g., the cloud or a local
hub). Further, in some IoT platforms, applications are written in a Domain Specific Language
(DSL) [42] and applications run in a sandbox for performance and security purposes [86].
2.2 IoT Security and Privacy
The growth of IoT devices has had profound impacts in settings such as automotive industry [58],
aviation [29], smart homes [38], medical wearables [105], agriculture [97], and smart cities [107].
While industry and users have widely embraced IoT, concerns are also raised about the security
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Table 1 Summary of studied IoT programming platforms (as of July 2018).
IoT Platform Architecture‡ App execution Abstract events Sandboxing* Official apps 3rd-party apps Programming lang.
SmartThings Hub Hub/Cloud ✓ ✓ ✓ [85] ✓ [84] Groovy
OpenHAB Hub Hub ✓ • ✓ [72] ✓ [74] Xtend-based DSL
Apple’s HomeKit Hub Hub ✓ ✓ n/a+ n/a Swift/Objective C
Android Things Cloud Cloud ✓ ✓ ✓ [9] n/a Java
Amazon AWS IoT Both Cloud ✓ ✓ n/a n/a SQL-like, (Java, Python, C)†
‡means whether devices connect to hub or cloud. *means sandboxing is enforced or not. • means it is optional.
†means that programming language depends on SDKs. + n/a means that there is no official app repository managed by the IoT platform.
and privacy of these digitally augmented spaces [22, 62, 73], and led to fervent calls for restrictions
and rigorous standards regulating their uses [35]. Indeed, the risk of IoT failures and misuse has
proven to be real. Vulnerable and faulty devices can lead to everything from privacy violations
(e.g., compromised baby-monitors [102]) to vehicle crashes and monetary theft [98]. In other
domains, failures can lead to serious health consequences (e.g., failed IoT pacemakers [93]) or even
result in catastrophic environmental disasters (e.g., pipeline explosions [53]).
In response to the security and privacy threats in IoT, most attempts to date aim to improve
perimeter defenses that harden the IoT infrastructure against attacks using firewalls [59], intrusion
detection systems [109], access control policies [47], and software patches [65]. Other efforts
have explored vulnerability analysis within specific IoT devices and IoT programming platforms.
Oluwafemi et al. [71] investigated the security risks in smart lights controlled by compromised
automation systems, and Ho et al. [48] studied the vulnerabilities of smart locks. Fernandes et al.
discovered design flaws in permission control of the SmartThings IoT platform [38], and Xu et
al. [104] surveyed the security problems in IoT hardware design. These works have found that
applications can be easily exploited to gain unauthorized access to control devices and leak sensitive
information of users and devices. Past analysis of IoT devices and environments have also focused
on securing an IoT app through source code analysis. Most previous studies rely on techniques
designed for mobile phone security [14, 28, 36, 45, 76, 111]. For instance, some systems infer an
app’s context to enforce permissions based on that context through runtime prompts [55] or asking
users for authorization through an interface [95].
There are also several recent surveys on IoT security and privacy, which differ in scope and focus
from this work. These surveys centered on the security of emerging IoT devices and protocols.
Alwari et al. proposed a methodology to analyze security properties for home-based IoT devices [5].
Roman et al. performed a study on reported IoT attacks and defenses [77]. Others focused on security
analysis of IoT architectures [110], available security solutions [56], and privacy threats [1, 112].
This work studies the space of IoT application security and privacy research through program-
analysis techniques. Those seeking a survey of IoT more broadly can look to many recent papers
covering this rapidly-developing area [40, 48, 71, 83, 104, 106].
3 IOT PROGRAMMING PLATFORMS
IoT platforms provide a software stack used to develop apps that monitor and control IoT devices.
In 2018, there are more than hundreds of IoT platforms in the marketplace [51]. We focus on five
IoT platforms that have the largest market share, Samsung’s SmartThings, OpenHAB, Apple’s
HomeKit, Android Things, and Amazon AWS IoT. We present a survey of these IoT platforms to
gain insights into the structure of their apps (Section 3.1). Table 1 summarizes our study. Our survey
was performed by reviewing the platforms’ official documentation, running their example IoT
apps, and analyzing their app construction logic. A broad investigation showed that IoT platforms
use similar programming structures and the differences lie only in the communication protocols
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Listing 1 SmartThings IoT application structure
1 /* Metadata describing how app is shown in UI */
2 definition(...)
3 /* Run-time binding of devices and user inputs */
4 preferences {...}
5 /* Predefined methods for updating, initialization, and installation of an app */
6 def updated() {...}
7 def initialize() {...}
8 def installed() {
9 subscribe(device, "device event", handler)
10 }
11 def handler() {
12 // Computation and actuators.
13 }
Listing 2 OpenHAB IoT rule structure
1 rule "<RULE_NAME>"
2 when
3 /* Define events */
4 <TRIGGER_CONDITION>
5 [or <TRIGGER_CONDITION2> [or ...]]
6 then
7 /* Computation and actuators */
8 <SCRIPT_BLOCK>
9 end
between IoT devices and edge systems. Therefore, we generalize their programming structures to
the sensor-computation-actuator idiom, which is used to model an IoT app (Section 3.2).
3.1 Overview of IoT Programming Platforms
Samsung’s SmartThings consists of a hub, apps, and the cloud back-end [24, 87]. The hub
controls the communication between connected devices, cloud back-end, and mobile apps. Apps are
developed in the Groovy language (a dynamic, object-oriented language) and executed in a Kohsuke
sandboxed environment. The cloud backend creates SmartDevices that act as software proxies for
physical devices and also runs the apps. The permission system in SmartThings allows a developer
to specify devices and user inputs required for an app at install time. Devices in SmartThings have
capabilities (i.e., permissions) that are composed of actions and events. Actions represent how to
control or actuate device states and events are triggered when device states change. SmartThings
apps control one or more devices (See Listing 1). Apps subscribe to device events or other pre-
defined events such as the icon-clicking event, and an event handler is invoked to handle it, which
may lead to further events and actions.
OpenHAB is an open-source automation platform built in the Eclipse IDE [42]. It provides vendor-
and technology-agnostic support for various devices specifically designed for home automation.
OpenHAB provides flexible device integration and rules to build automated tasks. Similar to the
SmartThings platform, the rules are implemented through triggers to react to the changes in the
environment (See Listing 2). For instance, event-based triggers listen to events generated from
devices; timing-based triggers respond to special times (e.g., midnight); system-based triggers run
with certain system events such as system start and shutdown. The rules are written in a Domain
Specific Language (DSL) based on the Xbase language, which is similar to the Xtend language [34].
Users can install OpenHAB apps by placing them in the rules folder of their installation directories
or by downloading from the Eclipse IoT Marketplace [74].
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Listing 3 Apple HomeKit IoT application structure
1 /* Create a home with properties such as the rooms */
2 private func initialHomeSetup() {...}
3 /* UI setup for devices and user inputs via HMAccessory */
4 override func tableView(...) {...}
5 /* Computation and actuators */
6 func eventsActions() {
7 /* Create an HMCharacteristicEvent that invokes when an event happens */
8
9 /* Use HMEventTrigger to create predicates that must be met before an action is executed */
10
11 /* Use executeActionSet to execute all the actions in a specified action set (actionSets) */
12 }
Listing 4 AWS IoT rule structure
1 "sql": "SELECT events from devices WHERE conditions",
2 "description": " Rule description",
3 "actions":
4 [
5 {
6 /* Take actions when an incoming message meets the conditions defined in the rule. */
7 }
8 ]
9 }
Apple’s HomeKit is a development kit that manages and controls compatible smart devices [12].
The HMHomeManager class describes a set of homes (locations). An HNHome class defines each
house and each room within that set. Each room may include a different number of accessories
(HMAccessory). Accessories represent the physical devices. Each accessory supports a service
(HMService), similar to the device capabilities in SmartThings, such as unlocking the door. Services
of an accessory are organized as HMServiceGroup which defines accessory services as an individual
asset. Accessories are also formed based on the zones (HMZone). This enables developers to group
home locations such as the basement, living room and kitchen. Lastly, each service includes specific
characteristics (HMCharacteristic), which describes the services such as a Boolean (locked or
unlocked) or floats (the thermostat temperature value). Developers write scripts to specify a set
of actions, triggers, and optional conditions to control HomeKit-compatible devices. HomeKit
applications can either be written in Swift or Objective C. Users can install HomeKit apps using
the Home mobile application provided by Apple [13].
Amazon Web Services (AWS) IoT provides communication between smart devices and the AWS
Cloud [6]. Connected devices transmit their states to AWS IoT Core. However, optional IoT hubs can
be installed to help bridge the connection or add additional use cases. For instance, a home user can
use Amazon’s Alexa voice assistant to control smart devices. A device shadow service abstracts the
physical device and saves the state of the devices for use by other devices or services. Applications
are deployed to AWS IoT Core as companion apps and server apps. Companion apps connect to
devices through the cloud. For example, a mobile app might use AWS IoT to unlock a smart lock
at the user’s request. Server apps monitor and control many connected devices. For instance, a
fleet operation app might use AWS IoT to map thousands of vehicle locations in real-time. AWS
IoT implements interfaces to create and interact with the devices. For instance, the AWS IoT API
offers a set of interfaces to develop apps using HTTP requests, and the AWS SDK wraps the HTTP
APIs and enables developing apps using language-specific APIs in languages such as Java and C.
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Listing 5 Android Things IoT application structure
1 public class ClassName extends Activity{
2 protected void onCreate(...) {
3 // Detect events and register a callback to take actions when the event happens
4 registerGpioCallback(GpioCallback callback) {...}
5 }
6 /* Close connections and nullify hardware references */
7 protected void onDestroy(...) {...}
8 /* Callback method invoked from onCreate() */
9 private callback(...) {
10 // Computation and actuators
11 }
12 }
Furthermore, AWS IoT supports SQL-like rules, which are used for filtering messages sent to AWS
IoT Core and transfer them to other devices or a AWS cloud service (See Listing 4). A rule can use
data from many devices and perform a set of actions at the same time.
Android Things is an Android-based embedded operating system that enables developers to build
smart devices and IoT apps [10]. It is built on the core Android app programming stack: official
software development kit, Android Studio, and Google Play services. Android Things uses the
same lower layers of the stack as Android. For the app framework, the Things Support Library
incorporated while specific Android APIs are omitted in Android Things. This library integrates
with new hardware types that are not found on conventional Android devices. An app running on
an embedded device creates an activity as the main method in its manifest file when the device
boots (See Listing 5). The apps then monitor device state changes through listeners. When a device
event happens, a callback is triggered to implement app functionality.
3.2 Generalizing IoT Application Structure
A broad investigation of dominant IoT platforms shows that IoT systems structure their apps’ design
around the sensor-computation-actuator idiom regardless of their purpose and complexity [22, 24].
Therefore, the source code of an IoT app can be translated to a platform-agnostic structure with
three types of common building blocks as shown in Figure 2: (1) Permissions grant access to devices
and user inputs used in the app to implement the app functionality; (2) Events reflect the association
between sensor readings and actuators: when a sensor reading is triggered, a device is actuated;
and (3) Call graphs represent the relationship between entry points and call-sites in the app.
Permissions are granted when an app is installed or updated. This is where various types of
devices and user inputs are described and granted access. Apps can only interact with devices
for which they have been given permission. Devices have capabilities of actuators and sensor
readings. Actuators represent the actions that a device can do and sensor readings represent the
state information of devices. Actuators and sensor readings are not one to one. While a device may
support many sensor readings, it may have a limited number of actuators, e.g., a door may have
opening, opened, closing and closed sensor readings, but has only open and close actuators.
Events connect particular sensor readings and handler methods. That is, when an event through
a sensor reading is triggered by a device, an associated event handler of an app is invoked. Event
handlers may actuate changes in the state of the devices. For instance, when a motion sensor reports
a motion-active event, an app may invoke an event handler to actuate a light switch from off to on.
We found that events are not limited to device events; while different IoT platforms name these
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Fig. 2 Mapping IoT application structures to the sensor-computation-actuator idiom.
differently, we call them abstract events and classify them into four different groups [22]1: (1) Timer
events; event-handlers are scheduled to take actions within a particular time or at pre-defined times
(e.g., an event-handler is invoked to take actions after a given number of minutes has elapsed or
at specific times such as sunset); (2) App touch events; for example, some action can be performed
when the user taps on a button in an app; (3) External events; IoT programming platforms may
allow an app to be accessible over the web; this enables external entities (e.g., If This Then That
(IFTTT) [49]) to make requests to the app and get information about or control end devices; (4)
what actions get generated may also depend on mode events, which are behavior filters that are
used to automate device actions; for instance, an app running in “home” mode turns off the alarm
and turns on the alarm when it is in the “away” mode.
An IoT app does not have an entry method (i.e., main method) due to its event-driven program
structure. Apps implicitly define entry points by subscribing events through event handler methods.
An app may have multiple entry points by subscribing to multiple events. Additionally, apps often
call other functions in event handlers to implement logic, send messages, or log device events to a
database. A call graph is used to represent this control-flow relationship between a particular event
handler and other functions the event handler invokes.
4 PROGRAM ANALYSIS OF IOT APPS
Program-analysis techniques operate on IoT app source code to achieve a variety of goals, such as
understanding apps’ security. In this section, we begin by identifying common program analysis
goals (Section 4.1), followed by challenges in IoT program analysis (Section 4.2). In the next section,
we classify the program analysis issues into three groups and discuss each of them (Section 5). In
the following, we explore contemporary approaches to understand security and privacy threats.
4.1 Goals of Analyses
We first discuss several common goals of performing program analysis on IoT apps. Many of these
goals remain open problems; thus understanding the goals can guide future work.
Sensitive Data Leaks. IoT devices have access to data that can be intensely private e.g., the
door is locked or unlocked and users are present home or away [22]. IoT platforms ensure only
coarse-grained access controls to sensitive information and provide limited controls over how that
information is used. For instance, if a user lets an app access the energy meter, the user cannot
know if the app will send the energy usage to the app developer, advertisers, or to any other entity.
1During the time we wrote the paper, some platforms started supporting additional abstract events. One such example
is OpenHAB’s system events, which are triggered when a system boots up or shuts down. We refer readers to platform
documentation for a complete set of events a platform supports.
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Fig. 3 Categorization of issues in IoT program analysis discussed in Section 5.
Abuse Prevention. IoT apps necessarily have access to functions that if abused would put the
user’s safety and security at risk, e.g., unlock doors when the user is not at home [48] or create
unsafe or damaging conditions by turning on a smart oven [31]. Therefore, it is crucial to prevent
IoT apps from abusing device capabilities by ensuring those apps operate devices according to a set
of security, safety, and functional properties [24].
Permission Misuse. The permission model of an IoT platform defines an app’s access to sensitive
actions such as device state changes. However, IoT apps may misuse permission models. This
can happen for two main reasons. First, a permission model may be coarse-grained and conflate
permissions of devices; for example, an app granting the permission to a door lock grants access
to both door lock, and door unlock actions, even though the app may only need the privilege of
locking the door [64]. Second, an app may trick users to acquire unneeded and dangerous device
permissions; for example, a smoke-alarm app may request the permission of a security camera to
disable it, even though the app does not need the permission to function [95].
Data Provenance. As IoT apps perform increasingly diverse activities, attacks and misconfigura-
tions require investigation. To address this, provenance systems use program instrumentation that
aims to collect IoT app information to construct complete and accurate app behavior. After that,
they aggregate that information into a data structure such as provenance graphs for forensics and
system diagnosis. For instance, a provenance system designed for IoT apps may provide complete
history of device actions and events, which can be used to identify the cause of an attack [15, 101].
4.2 Issues in IoT Program Analysis
Program analysis has been applied, either statically or dynamically, to many different settings such
as mobile apps. From our study of five IoT platforms, we found that IoT platforms possess a few
unique characteristics and issues when compared to other platforms.
First, in the case of Android, a well-defined Intermediate representation (IR) is available, and
analysis can directly analyze IR code. For instance, popular analysis frameworks including Soot [60]
and WALA [100] that have been used to analyze Android app source code provide libraries to
convert Dalvik bytecode to the Jimple IR [17], to construct call graphs [66], and to perform inter-
procedural dataflow analysis via graph reachability [19]. However, IoT programming platforms are
diverse, and each uses its own programming language. Therefore, the analysis must capture the
event-driven nature of IoT apps, and perform analysis on it.
Second, IoT apps control physical hardware peripherals and drivers. Consequently, IoT apps
have qualitatively different vulnerabilities resulting from handling physical processes such as
temperature, smoke, motion, humidity, water leak, and luminance. For instance, an adversary might
misuse the capability of an IoT device through physical channels to achieve a damaging effect. To
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Fig. 4 Categorization of issues based on program analysis type.
illustrate, we consider an app that grants permissions to a smart light, which supports color and
intensity capabilities. The app may strobe light at a frequency and change colors to various shades,
which could trigger seizures in users who have photosensitive epilepsy [78].
Third, IoT apps may interact with each other when they are co-located in an environment. The
interaction between apps, among others, may happen when a device action executed in an app’s
event handler is used as an event to trigger another app’s event handler [24]. For instance, two
apps interact with each other when the “switch off” action of an app is used as a “switch turned-off”
event in another app. The interactions among apps may lead to undesirable device states causing
security and safety violations and exposing users to risks such as a locked door when there is a fire.
Fourth, trigger-action platforms such as IFTTT [49], Zapier [108], and Microsoft Flow [68] are
increasingly used to bridge the divide between physical (e.g., IoT devices) and digital (e.g., e-mail
services, social media platforms) processes. These platforms allow users to use rules that connect
the events and actions of IoT devices with the events and actions of digital services. For example, a
user may use a rule that posts a Tweet when she turns on the light in the living room, and similarly,
another rule logs the user’s presence to a spreadsheet file when the front door is unlocked. This
inter-tangled environment expands the interactions among devices to online services [23, 92]; for
example, an IoT app that subscribes to the switch “turn-on” event interacts with a trigger-action
platform rule that “turns on” the switch when the user is tagged in a photo on Facebook.
Lastly, each IoT platform has its own idiosyncrasies that can pose challenges to program analy-
sis [22]. For instance, SmartThings IoT apps written in the Groovy programming language that
allows apps to perform call by reflection and allows web-service apps; each of these features makes
analysis more difficult and requires special treatment.
5 ANALYSIS OF IOT PROGRAMS
Based on our discussion in the previous Section, we split the analysis characteristics and challenges
of IoT apps into three groups as shown in Figure 3. In this section, we begin by presenting IoT-
specific analysis issues (Section 5.1). We then detail IoT application idiosyncrasies (Section 5.2).
Lastly, we present general precision requirements for IoT code analysis (Section 5.3).
Type of ProgramAnalysis. Previously covered issues can be addressed through static or dynamic
code analysis, and in some cases, issues are related to both. For example, path sensitivity is not an
issue in dynamic analyses since they follow execution paths; they instead suffer from coverage
problems. We split these issues based on the analysis type as shown in Figure 4. In static analysis,
the source code of an app is analyzed without running it, and in dynamic analysis, the code is
run, possibly under-instrumented conditions, to see if there are likely problems [4]. Static analysis
benefits from analyzing the complete source code whereas, in dynamic analysis, only a portion of
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Table 2 Description of official and third-party SmartThings IoT apps used in our discussion.
Number of Apps Unique Device Types Avg/Max LOC
App functionality Official Third-party Official Third-party Official Third-party
Convenience 80 26
49 37 244/2633 247/1360
Security and Safety 19 10
Personal Care 10 0
Home Automation 48 24
Entertainment 10 0
Smart Transport 1 2
† We determined an app’s functionality by checking definition blocks in its source code.
the code is executed; thus analysis results are limited to observed executions. Furthermore, static
analysis may lead to over-approximations by generalizing all possible behaviors of a program,
risking false positives [37]. For instance, an analysis tool detects a sensitive data leak through a
piece of code in an IoT app which is not executable at run-time. A dynamic analysis may under-
approximate because the execution inputs of a program are often incomplete; thus the analysis
may produce false negatives. For example, an analysis tool may miss vulnerabilities or malicious
behaviors in an IoT app at run-time.
Example Code Blocks. During our discussion, we will provide example code blocks obtained
from our analysis of 230 SmartThings apps [22]. We primarily reference SmartThings because a
large number of open-source market apps are available, and it has a detailed, publicly available
documentation that helps validate our findings [86]. In late 2017, we obtained 168 official (vetted)
apps from the SmartThings GitHub repository [85] and 62 community-contributed third-party
(non-vetted) apps from the SmartThings community forum [84] (See Table 2). 2 These apps were
selected to include various IoT devices and contexts that encompass diverse real-life use cases.
5.1 IoT-specific Analysis Issues
IoT apps possess unique characteristics and challenges in terms of program analysis when compared
to other platform apps. In this section, we enumerate five challenges that are mainly due to the
capabilities provided by IoT platforms to the apps.
Physical Channels. IoT devices integrate physical processes into digital connectivity. Misuse of
physical processes allows an app to deviate from a device’s intended functionality to achieve an
unexpected effect. We give three examples of physical processes that lead to security and privacy
issues: (1) data-leaks through side-channels, (2) health-related risk through device functionality
misuse, and (3) safety issues through indirect physical interactions.
We demonstrate the first two examples with an app that grants access to a light device. The light
has the capability to change color, hue, saturation, and intensity level. The first example is an app
that creates a side-channel by changing the light intensity to notify an adversary or another app
when the households are sleeping or not at home [22, 55] (See Listing 6). The second example is an
app that flashes the lights by adjusting the light intensity and changes the light color at regular
intervals. This process creates visual stimuli that can trigger seizures in people who suffer from
photosensitive epilepsy [78]. Similar health-related risks can be inflicted on users through other
physical processes such as temperature and sound. To address misuse of physical processes in
these examples, one solution would be to construct a set of templates that define insecure and
2The apps are available at our IoTBench test-suite repository [52].
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Listing 6 An example code block that leaks sensitive information through physical channels
1 /* An app leaks information by changing light intensity */
2 /* Similar logic can be used to strobe the light */
3 subscribe(motion, "motion.inactive", motionInactiveHandler)
4 def motionInactiveHandler(evt) {
5 runIn(60 ∗ minutes, checkMotionStatus)
6 }
7 def checkMotionStatus(evt) {
8 if (evt.value == "inactive") { // motion inactive
9 // setting intensity of the switch 0
10 myLight.setLevel(0)
11 changeIntensity()
12 }
13 }
14 def changeIntensity() {
15 def value = myLight.currentState("level")
16 // misuse light functionality
17 if (value<=20) {
18 state.bool=true
19 myLight.setLevel(value+20) }
20 if (value>20 && value<80 && state.bool) {
21 myLight.setLevel(value+20) }
22 if (value>=80) {
23 state.bool=false
24 myLight.setLevel(value−20) }
25 if (value>20 && value<80 && !state.bool) {
26 myLight.setLevel(value−20) }
27 // change light intensity every 3 seconds
28 runIn(60∗0.05,changeIntensity)
29 }
unsafe device states for side channels and health-related risks. For instance, a template says that an
app must not change the volume of a music player above a threshold to prevent hearing loss and
tinnitus. The analysis then tracks the device states either at install time or run-time to ensure that
an app does not cause the volume state to exceed a threshold or create spikes.
In the third example, an adversary controls a physical process to control some other devices
indirectly. For instance, an adversary increases the room’s temperature by turning on the heater to
activate an app that opens thewindowwhen the room temperature exceeds a threshold value [24, 32].
This process would allow a burglar to break into homes via windows by controlling the room’s
temperature. To address indirect access to devices, an app may add extra path conditions to guard
device actions based on the app’s context. Turning to our example, the window would be open
when the temperature value is above a threshold and with some additional conditions such as when
the user is at home and when the time is between sunrise and sunset.
Simulation and Modeling of IoT Programs. A collection of many IoT devices form a complex
system that requires simulators to execute and analyze them accurately. In contrast to traditional
modeling and simulation frameworks, simulation of large-scale and heterogeneous IoT environ-
ments requires capturing the state of many devices, and the interdependence between events,
actions and computational logic [57]. The research community and industry have recently explored
the requirements for modeling and simulation of IoT implementations [3, 30, 46, 63]. For instance,
IoT-lab provides an infrastructure for testing heterogeneous IoT devices [3], and IoTify enables
IoT application development by simulating virtual devices in the cloud [57]. However, to our
knowledge, current IoT simulation tools that researchers often use (e.g., SmartThings web-based
IoT simulator [88]) have insufficient support for diverse devices and events, which prevents the
simulation of apps that have various functionality.
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Fig. 5 An example of interacting IoT apps. simulate-occupancy app interacts with welcome-home app through
the light turn-on event. (E is for Event, and A is for Action.)
Another noteworthy point is that physical processes of devices including temperature, illumi-
nance, power consumption, and humidity are often hard to replicate in a simulated environment.
Similar to simulating cyber-physical systems and other physical process-driven systems, IoT anal-
ysis tools must consider the evolution of the state of an IoT system over time. This requirement
motivates the need for an IoT simulation environment that executes IoT apps by means of a discrete-
event simulation engine through continuous-time solvers and state machine-based modeling [63].
Automated Test-caseGeneration.Dynamic analysis of IoT apps requires input data for execution
of the apps [81]. In IoT apps, inputs are the events that trigger the apps (i.e., entry points of an app),
and user and device inputs. This introduces a challenge of automating systematic and scalable input
generation for IoT apps that control a diverse set of devices with a wide range of internal states. For
instance, devices such as a thermostat and power meter may have a discrete (e.g., integer-valued) or
continuous attributes that would lead to a large input space—generating an input for every possible
value in such cases would result in a large number of test cases.
Similar to other computing platforms, fuzzing and symbolic execution can be used to increase
code-coverage for an automated test-case generation. Fuzzing executes the app with random input
data, and symbolic execution uses symbolic inputs to perform path-based exploration [20]. For
instance, tools for Android, such as Google’s Android Monkey [8], generate random test case inputs
of user events and system-level events. To improve test input generation, recent techniques use
heuristics that guide input generation to cover app source code intelligently, avoid redundant test
paths and enable multi-objective automated testing [21, 26, 67, 75, 99]. Yet, to our knowledge, tools
that automate test input data and event generation to execute IoT apps are largely non-existent.
This motivates future work to improve test-case generation techniques as applied to IoT.
Multi-app Analysis. Multi-app analysis that targets IoT environments studies the joint behavior
of the apps whereas individual app analysis considers each app in isolation. In a multi-app analysis,
apps interact through a common device or abstract events [23, 24]. More specifically, we found that
apps interact with each other, (1) when an event handler of an app changes a device attribute, which
triggers another event that is subscribed to by another app; for example, an app turns on the light
switch when there is smoke, and another app unlocks the door when the light is turned on, (2) when
multiple apps change the same device attribute of some device; for example, a water-leak-detector
app shuts off the water valve when there is a leak, while a smoke-alarm app opens the water
valve to activate the sprinkler, and (3) when apps that subscribe to the same event change a device
attribute in conflicting ways; for example, when motion is detected, one app turns on a switch
while another app turns off the switch. We found that apps also interact through modes, which are
behavior filters that automate device actions. For instance, an app that changes the “away” mode
to the “home” mode when a user arrives home interacts with an app that uses the “mode change”
event to activate the security alarm.
The interactions among devices may cause security, safety, and privacy risks even though
individual apps are safe in operation [24, 25, 32]. To illustrate, we consider simulate-occupancy
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Fig. 6 Example IF rules in a trigger-action platform. The left IF rule causes an integrity violation, and the right
one violates user privacy. (E is for Event, and A is for Action.)
app co-resident with welcome-home app (See Figure 5). Simulate-occupancy turns on and turns off
the light switch to simulate occupancy when the user is not home. Welcome-home brews coffee and
turns on the heater when the light is turned on. Simulate-occupancy interacts with welcome-home
through the “light-on” event. However, unexpected behavior may happen when these apps interact
with each other. In the example, the analysis reveals a safety violation when the user is not home:
the heater and coffee machine are turned on when the bedroom light is turned on because the
“light-on” is used as an event in welcome-home app. To prevent undesired and unsafe states through
interactions, an analysis requires finding the interactions among apps, developing policies for
undesired device states, checking the app conforms to those properties when interacting with other
apps and blocking the states causing the policy violations.
Interaction between IoT Devices and Trigger-action Platform Services. Trigger-action plat-
forms such as IFTTT [49], Zapier [108] and Apiant [11] allow users to connect services together.
Services include a set of APIs on a trigger-action platform. Users authorize services to their
trigger-action platform accounts. For example, a user with a SmartThings IoT platform account
can authorize the SmartThings service through the OAuth protocol to communicate with her
SmartThings account. Services communicate with each other using REST APIs over HTTP [41].
Trigger-action platforms allow users to create custom automation on services through DO and
IF rules. These rules let users connect a trigger in a service to take the desired action in another
service—when an event happens in a service, the platform automatically triggers a separate action
in another service. For instance, As of May of 2018, IFTTT has the largest market share [50]; it
provides users with 500 services, 158 of which are IoT services. IFTTT enables IoT applications
such as fitness trackers and other wearables, hobbyist projects, and connected homes. DO rules
act as virtual buttons, which can trigger a set of actions; for example, a DO rule may turn on a
smart switch when a button is tapped. IF rules combine two services using a trigger and an action;
for example, an IF Rule may make a phone call to the security guard when a motion sensor of a
smart home service detects motion after midnight. Users are required to install a companion app
provided by the trigger-action platform to trigger DO rules. IF rules run automatically after users
configure them via a trigger-action platform web API.
Similar to multi-app analysis, the interaction between IoT devices and trigger-action platform
services may cause security and privacy issues [18, 23, 92]. Figure 6 shows two examples of IF rules
that connect a smart home to Twitter and Google Spreadsheet services. IF rule #1 turns on lights
when a user is tagged in a Twitter post. IF rule #2 logs the door state to a public spreadsheet when
the door is unlocked. In the first example, an integrity violation occurs because the untrusted event
(Tweet post) changes the state of a trusted action (light on). In the second example, a confidentiality
violation occurs because the sensitive information (door unlocked) is made publicly available.
Another point worth noting is that these services may also create interactions between IoT apps
and services—the actions and events of services and IoT apps can be linked together, similar to the
case of interaction between multiple apps.
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Listing 7 Sample code blocks for RESTful APIs
1 /* An example use of Restful APIs */
2 mappings {
3 path("/switches") {
4 action: [GET: "listSwitches"] }
5 path("/switches/:command") {
6 action: [PUT: "updateSwitches"] }
7 }
8 def listSwitches() {
9 switches.each {
10 resp << [name: it.displayName, value:
11 it.currentValue("switch")] }
12 return resp
13 }
Analyses targeting trigger-action platforms require information flow analysis that considers the
security and privacy of the environment. More specifically, an analysis may extract the events and
actions of the trigger-action rules and label them with the integrity and confidentiality labels. For
instance, unlocking a door might be labeled with trusted, and saving a device state to a public file
might be labeled confidential. We found that this process is not a trivial endeavor because trigger-
action rules are strings and a rule’s event and actions often do not match with the capabilities
defined in an IoT programming platform. For instance, Santa detector IFTTT rule’s definition [80]
says that “Ho ho ho! Receive a notification when Santa arrives to deliver you some Merry Christmas
joy (and presents)”. Determining the actions and events, and labeling them may need user help or
advanced natural language processing techniques.
5.2 IoT Application Idiosyncrasies
Each IoT platform has its own idiosyncrasies based on how they structure the apps and the
programming languages they use. These idiosyncrasies require special treatment for analysis
precision. In this subsection, we give a couple of example idiosyncrasies.
RESTful APIs. RESTful APIs allow external entities to access smart devices and manage those
devices. For instance, an app can set the cooling point of a climate control system when the
temperature value obtained from a weather forecasting service is above a threshold. These apps
declare mappings that relate endpoints, HTTP operations, and callback methods. The SmartThings
platform names these apps web-service apps [89], other platforms provide similar functionality
through APIs that enables communicating with the external services. For instance, AWS IoT Core
allows both companion and server apps to access connected devices through RESTful APIs [6].
Listing 7 shows a code snippet of a SmartThings web-service app. The /switches endpoint handles
an HTTP GET request and returns the state information of configured switches by calling the
listSwitches() method; the /switches/:command endpoint handles a PUT request by invoking the
updateSwitches() method to turn on or off the switches. In our analysis of SmartThings apps,
we found 23 official and six third-party web-service apps. These APIs might be used to transmit
sensitive data to external services or receive undesired device commands from external services
and [22]. Turning to our example app, if an adversary compromises the forecast server and sends
fake temperature values to the app, she can turn on many high-power devices to cause outages [90].
Language-Inherited Operations. Analysis techniques need to address the challenges, which
programming languages of IoT platforms pose, for analysis precision. In the following discus-
sion, we will provide two examples from IoT apps developed with the Groovy language on the
SmartThings platform: closures and call by reflection. We found in our corpus 37 official, and nine
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Listing 8 Sample code blocks for language-inherited operations
1 /* A code block of an app using closures */
2 def eventHandler(evt) {
3 def currSwitches = switches.currentSwitch
4 def onSwitches = currSwitches.findAll {
5 switchVal −> switchVal == "on" ? true : false
6 }
7 }
8 /* Reflection example 1 */
9 def getMethod() {
10 httpGet("http://url") { resp −>
11 if (resp.status == 200) {
12 name = resp.data.toString()
13 }
14 }
15 "$name"() // call by reflection
16 }
17 def foo() {...}
18 def bar() {...}
19 /* Reflection example 2 */
20 subscribe(presenceSensor, "present", presenceChanged)
21 subscribe(presenceSensor, "not present", presenceChanged)
22 def presenceChanged(evt) {
23 def s
24 if (evt.value == "not present") {
25 s = "offDevices"
26 } else {
27 s = "onDevices"
28 }
29 performAction(s)
30 }
31 def performAction(String f) {
32 $f() // call by reflection
33 }
34 def onDevices() { // turns on switches }
35 def offDevices() { // turns off switches }
36 def otherFunction() { // leak data or misuse device states }
third-party SmartThings apps use closures and nine official apps and one third-party app use call
by reflection. Closures are often used in SmartThings apps to loop through a list of devices and
perform computation on each device. Listing 8 (lines 1–7) shows an example code block in which
a closure is used to iterate through the currSwitches object to identify switches that are on. For
analysis precision, tools need to analyze the structure of closures and inspect expressions within
the closures, for example, to see how taints should be propagated in taint tracking [22].
Call by reflection is used to invoke a method by passing its name as a string. For instance, a
method foo() can be invoked by declaring a string name="foo" requested from an external server
through the httpGet() interface and thereafter called by reflection through $name (See Listing 8
(lines 8–18)). In another example, a developer defines a string conditioned on the state of a presence
sensor and passes the string as an argument to a function call (See Listing 8 (lines 19–36)). To handle
reflective calls, an analysis’s call graph construction may add all methods in an app as possible call
targets, as a safe over-approximation [22]. For the example in Listing 8, an analysis may include
both foo() and bar() methods into the targets of the call by reflection in the call graph of an app.
Furthermore, an analysis may use string analysis to identify possible values of strings and refine
the target sets of reflective calls.
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Listing 9 An example code block for flow sensitivity
1 energy = powerMeter.currentValue
2 energy = developer_threshold
3 message = "energy consumption is $energy"
4 sendSMS(message, "attackerPhone")
Listing 10 An example for illustrating context sensitivity
1 def presenceHandler(evt) {
2 if (evt.value == "present") {
3 take_actions("present")
4 } else {
5 take_actions("not present")
6 }
7 }
8
9 def take_actions(evt_value) {
10 if (evt.value == "present") {
11 door.unlock(); lights.on()
12 msg = "do not disturb please"
13 sendSMS(msg, "userDefinedPhone")
14 }
15 if (evt.value == "not present") {
16 door.lock(); lights.off();
17 msg = "user left, event: $evt_value"
18 sendSMS(msg, "attackerPhone")
19 }
20 }
5.3 Analysis Sensitivities
IoT app analysis can benefit from a more precise program analysis, such as context-sensitive
analysis. We next present sensitivities an IoT source code analysis might need for precision and
motivate them through code examples. Although these examples are from SmartThings apps, the
sensitivity issues are valid for all IoT programming platform apps as many IoT platforms rely on
general-purpose programming languages.
Flow Sensitivity. Flow sensitivity considers the order of execution in a program analysis [70].
Specifically, a flow-sensitive analysis accounts for variables whose contents change during program
execution. In contrast, in a flow-insensitive analysis, a variable includes one qualifier abstracting
the values that the variable gets during the entire program execution. In Listing 9, an example
IoT app is presented. A flow-sensitive analysis would not flag it to have a data leak, because the
message variable has a final value defined by the developer regardless of the sensitive value the
power meter has (powerMeter.currentValue). However, a flow-insensitive analysis would flag it to
leak sensitive data because it determines that the current value of the power meter can be leaked
when the ordering of assignments is not taken into account.
Context Sensitivity. Context-sensitive analyses span multiple procedures, considering a target
function block within the context of the code calling it [82]. Specifically, if call-site contexts are used,
only execution paths that are feasible by matching calls and returns are considered during analysis.
In Listing 10, an analysis using depth-one call-site context sensitivity distinguishes the two call
sites of take_action on lines 3 and 5. This means that the analysis analyzes take_action separately
through arguments of “present” and “not_present” for those two call sites. A context-sensitive
analysis infers that, for the first call, there is no data leak since msg is sent to a user-defined phone;
yet, for the second call, a message is sent to an attacker’s phone, which leaks information. In
18 B. Celik et al.
Listing 11 An example code block for field-sensitivity
1 subscribe(theSwitch, "switch.on", turnedOnHandler)
2 // initialize switchCounter and presenceCounter to 0
3 def turnedOnHandler() {
4 s_threshold = 10
5 state.presenceCounter = state.presenceCounter + 1
6 p_counter = state.presenceCounter
7 state.switchCounter = state.switchCounter + 1
8 s_counter = state.switchCounter
9 if (s_counter > s_threshold) {
10 // invoke device actions
11 }
12 if (p_counter == 1) {
13 // send text message
14 state.presenceCounter = 0
15 }
16 }
Listing 12 An example code block for path-sensitivity
1 input "ther", "capability.thermostat"
2 tempMax = 0
3 tempMin = 0
4
5 if (developerSetPoint < 65) {
6 tempMin = ther.currentValue
7 }
8 if (developerSetPoint > 65) {
9 tempMax = tempMin
10 }
11 message = "thermostat heating is set to: $tempMax"
12 sendSMS(message, "attackerPhone")
contrast, a context-insensitive analysis considers even infeasible paths in the control flow graph
and would decide that both calls leak information. We found that depth-one call-site sensitivity in
230 analyzed apps was precise. Yet, more complex IoT apps might require contexts of greater depth.
Field Sensitivity. Field-insensitive analysis treats all fields in an object as equivalent [91]. IoT
apps can use objects for various purposes; for example, SmartThings provides state objects (state
and atomicState) as external storage to persist data across executions. State variables are often
used in conditional branches to guard state transitions. In our analysis, we found 74 official and
34 third-party apps declare state variables. Listing 11 presents an example app using the state
object to store a field named switchCounter to track the number of times a switch is turned on. A
field-insensitive system would not distinguish presenceCounter from switchCounter (Indeed, the
field insensitive analysis would not consider fields at all). A field-sensitive analysis is required to
track all fields defined in the state and atomicState objects. For example, the switch-off device
state is guarded by the predicate state.switchCounter>10. Furthermore, the analysis may label
state variables in predicates as “state-variables”, indicating they are stored in external data storage.
Path Sensitivity. Path sensitivity requires that the predicates at conditional branches are con-
sidered in a program analysis [70]. For instance, in Listing 12, the value of the sensitive infor-
mation ther.currentValue never flows to the message variable because the assignments tempMin
= ther.currentValue and tempMax = tempMin never execute together in the program execution.
A path-insensitive system, however, will conservatively analyze the impossible program exe-
cution "tempMax = 0; tempMin = 0; tempMin = ther.currentValue; tempMax = tempMin; message =
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Listing 13 An example code block for predicate analysis and provenance tracking
1 input "userTemp", "number", title: "Degrees", description: "Adjust temp or default is used by this many
degrees", required: false, defaultValue:0
2 subscribe (presenceSensor, "present", presenceHandler)
3
4 def presentHandler() {
5 def threshold = 5
6 def x = threshold + evaluate(userTemp)
7 thermostat.setHeatingPoint(x)
8 }
9
10 def evaluate() {
11 if (userTemp == 0) {
12 if (currentValue("power")<50) {
13 return 68
14 } else {
15 sendSMS(userPhone, "power usage is high")
16 lightSwitch.off() // prevent high energy use
17 return 63
18 }
19 } else {
20 return userTemp
21 }
22 }
"thermostat... : $tempMax"" in which the message string contains sensitive information due to
an explicit flow from the thermostat state (i.e., ther.currentValue). One way of achieving path
sensitivity is through predicate analysis. This is to track the predicates on a particular path dur-
ing analysis. Take Listing 13 as an example. There are three feasible paths in presentHandler: (1)
userTemp=0 and currentValue("power")<50 as the path condition of the path that returns constant
value 68; (2) userTemp=0 and currentValue("power")≥50 as the path condition of the path that sends
a text message, turns off the switch and returns a constant 63; (3) userTemp!=0 as the path condition
of the path that returns userTemp.
Provenance tracking. It is often necessary for an analysis to track sources of data, for example,
whether a piece of data is hard-coded by the developer or received as a user input. When such data
is used in a device action, knowing its provenance can be extremely helpful in deciding whether the
action is intended, or by mistake, or even malicious. In the example of Listing 13, constants 63 and
68, and threshold are hard-coded by the developer, and as a result x is computed from hard-coded
data by the developer; therefore they should be labeled as “developer-defined”. In some cases, a
user of an application can define some data at install time. For instance, if the threshold value were
entered by a user, then x would receive both the label “user-defined” and “developer-defined”. In
our analysis of 230 SmartThings apps, we found that apps mostly propagate a developer-defined
constant or a user input to places that change device attributes. Occasionally, simple arithmetic is
performed; for example, a user input is stored in y, followed by x=y+10, followed by changing a
device attribute using x.
6 STUDY OF IOT ANALYSIS SYSTEMS
This section presents a study of six recent IoT analysis systems from the literature that use program-
analysis techniques for security and privacy. Table 3 gives an overview of the systems. We begin
by introducing analysis techniques used in these systems (Section 6.1). The systems, excluding
FlowFence, use SmartThings apps for evaluation; thus, we present a background of SmartThings
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Table 3 A Summary of studied IoT analysis systems.
System Purpose Analysis method Supp. tech. Analysis type IR Analysis DS IoT platform Input Gen. # Apps
FlowFence [39] Data leaks Opacified comp. — Dynamic ✗ Source code —1 ✓• 3
Saint [22] Data leaks Taint analysis — Static ✓ AST ST⋄ n/a∗ 2302
ContexIoT [55] Permission misuse Code inst. Taint analysis Dynamic ✗ AST ST ✓ 2833
SmartAuth [95] Permission misuse Code inst.5 NLP Static5 ✗ AST ST ⊖+ 1804
ProvThings [101] Data provenance Code inst. Program slicing Dynamic ✗ AST ST ✓ 2363
Soteria [24] Abuse prevention Symbolic exe. Model checking Static ✓ AST ST n/a 652
1 Evaluates three existing IoT apps on Android OS. 2 Includes both official and third-party apps. 3 App type not specified.
4 Includes only official apps. ⋄ ST refers to the SmartThings IoT platform. ∗ n/a, not applicable for a static system.
5 SmartAuth extracts an app’s behavior through static analysis; however it also collects runtime information to block unauthorized device actions.
• FlowFence, ContexIoT and ProvThings employ brute-force fuzzing that randomly generates user inputs and events to execute the apps.
+ ⊖ means that we could not find enough implementation details to be conclusive.
apps (Section 6.2). Lastly, we study systems with regards to the issues we have introduced (Sec-
tion 6.3). In particular, we contrast analysis types and practical implementation specifics.
IoT Systems.We give an overview of six recent IoT analysis systems studied throughout.
(1) FlowFence enforces sensitive data flow control in IoT apps and discloses intended data flow
patterns to restrict the usage of sensitive data in IoT apps [39].
(2) Saint is a static taint analysis tool that finds sensitive data flows in IoT apps by tracking
information flow from taint sources to taint sinks [22].
(3) ContexIoT is a context-based permission system that infers the app context automatically
and enforces permissions based on that context [55].
(4) SmartAuth collects device information, annotations and descriptions from app source to
generate an authorization interface [95].
(5) ProvThings captures system-level provenance through security-sensitive APIs and leverages
it for forensic reconstruction and attack investigation [101].
(6) Soteria extracts a state-model from an IoT app’s source code for validating whether an app or
multi-app environment adheres to safety, security, and functional properties [24].
6.1 Fundamental Analysis Techniques
We give an overview of analysis techniques used in six examined IoT analysis systems. Section 6.3
studies the systems with respect to these techniques.
Taint Tracking. Taint analysis begins by identifying sensitive data at a taint source with a label
that shows the type of information. Taint tracking then starts from a taint source and propagates
taint when tainted data is copied and deletes taint when all traces of tainted data are removed
(e.g., when some variable is loaded with a constant). The impacted data is then flagged at a taint
sink (often via the Internet or messaging interface) before it is sent out the system. Lastly, the
impacted data is investigated with malware detection tools or by human analysts to determine
whether a leak actually constitutes a violation.
Code Instrumentation. Code instrumentation adds specific code to the source code of an app to
collect the app’s run-time behavior [69]. The code added during instrumentation is often called
instrumented code. The instrumented code executes as part of the program’s normal behavior, but
it collects information necessary for some analysis such as context identification, attack detection,
and attack reconstruction. Instrumenting every instruction of an app may incur high memory and
performance overhead; thus, instrumentation aims to add the minimal code necessary for analysis.
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Symbolic Execution. Symbolic execution indicates that an app is executed with symbolic value
as an argument [16]. Unlike concrete execution, where the path is decided by the input, in symbolic
execution, the app may practice any feasible path. Symbolic execution enables reasoning about an
app behavior on many different inputs, which enables to discover infeasible paths, identify bugs
and vulnerabilities, and create test inputs [81].
Model Checking.Model checking is used to analyze the correctness of software concerning some
formally defined program property [54]. Systems or applications are first represented as finite state
machines, and the execution of the software is validated against specified specifications through a
generic model checker. The specifications are written in temporal logic formulas such as Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [27].
Program Slicing. Program slicing is used to compute program slices that include the program
parts affecting the values at some point of interest [103]. For example, the slice of a value at a
statement includes a set of statements involved in computing the value in that statement. Program
slicing can be used, among others, in debugging to capture the minimal program essentials, and in
information flow control to restrict trusted data from interacting with untrusted data.
Opacified Computing. Opacified computing provides sandboxes in places where an app have
functions that access privacy-sensitive information or device states. Under this model, developers
explicitly declare intended functions, and a model is constructed to enforce access to the declared
functions and prevent all others [39]. To achieve this, the developers split an app into modules that
operate on functions. The sandbox accumulates information from functions and returns the results
which only respect the flow policies.
6.2 Analysis of SmartThings Apps
The analysis systems, excluding FlowFence, use SmartThings apps for evaluation. We provide a
brief overview of SmartThings apps and present techniques for program analysis of its apps.
SmartThings Apps are developed with a dynamic, object-oriented language Groovy in a sand-
boxed environment [22, 38]. The sandbox limits developers to a specific subset of the Groovy
language for performance and security. For instance, the sandbox bans apps from creating their
own classes and threads. The cloud backend creates software wrappers for physical devices and
runs the apps. SmartThings apps are executed within the SmartThings ecosystem, either in the hub
or the SmartThings cloud. Users can install SmartThings apps either from the market or proprietary
system via SmartThings Mobile [24]. In the former, publishing an app in the official market requires
the developer to submit the source code of the app for review. Official apps appear in the market
after the completion of a lengthy review process [24, 87]. In the latter, organizations can develop
an app and make it accessible using the Web IDE. These self-published apps do not receive any
official review process and are often shared in the SmartThings official community forum [24, 84].
Program Analysis of SmartThings Apps. Performing a program analysis from the source code
of an app requires, among other things, building of the app’s Inter-procedural Control Flow Graph
(ICFG) [22]. Since Groovy is a JVM-hosted language, one natural approach would be first to compile
Groovy code into Java bytecode using the Groovy compiler and then perform analysis via the help
of an analysis framework such as Soot [96]. However, we found that this approach may not be
feasible due to the heavy use of reflection in the bytecode generated by the Groovy compiler [22]. In
particular, the Groovy compiler translates direct method calls into a call by reflection. IoT systems
often analyze Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) representations of Groovy source directly. The Groovy
compiler supports customizing the compilation process by supporting compiler hooks, through
which one can insert extra passes into the compiler. This is similar to the modular design of the
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Table 4 Review of IoT analysis systems based on our discussion in Section 5.
IoT-specific issues IoT app idiosyncrasies Analysis sensitivity
System I.1 I.2 I.3 I.4 S.1 S.2 S.3 P.1 P.2 P.3 P.4 P.5
FlowFence [39] ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ n/a† n/a n/a ✓ n/a n/a n/a n/a
Saint [22] ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
ContexIoT [55] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n/a ✓ n/a ✓
SmartAuth [95] ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
ProvThings [101] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n/a ✓ n/a ✓
Soteria [24] ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Legend
IoT-specific issues IoT app idiosyncrasies‡ Analysis sensitivity
I.1 Multi-app analysis I.2 Trigger-action platform support S.1 RESTful APIs⋆ P.1 Flow sensitivity P.2 Context sensitivity
I.3 Proactive defense I.4 No runtime prompts S.2 Closures and other operations P.3 Field sensitivity P.4 Path Sensitivity
S.3 Calls by reflection P.5 Provenance Tracking
‡We split the criterion of language-inherited operations of the SmartThings platform into “closures and other operations”, and “call by reflection”.
∗ n/a means that not applicable. ⋆ RESTful APIs refer to web-service apps in SmartThings platform.
LLVM compiler [61]. Therefore, systems often use ASTTransformation to hook into the compiler,
GroovyClassVisitor to obtain the entry points and the structure of the app and GroovyCodeVisitor
to visit method calls and expressions inside AST nodes [22, 44].
6.3 Review of IoT Systems
We review the IoT analysis systems in light of the program-analysis issues developed in Section 5.We
broadly split the systems into two groups based on their goals. The first group includes FlowFence
and Saint for privacy, and the second group includes ProvThings, SmartAuth, ContexIoT, and
Soteria for safety and security. Our review discusses issues in IoT that have been addressed by prior
work and issues that remain open problems. We summarize the characteristics of the systems in
Table 4. The following sections discuss the findings of this review process.
6.3.1 Systems for Privacy. We start our analysis with FlowFence and Saint for use (and potential
avenues for misuse) of sensitive information in IoT apps. The main difference between FlowFence
and Saint lies in the application of the taint tracking. FlowFence, a dynamic system, enforces
intended data flow patterns through Quarantined Modules (QMs) whereas Saint, a static system,
tracks data flow paths from taint sources to taint sinks. In FlowFence, a developer splits the source
code of an app into QMs. QMs run on sensitive data in a sandbox. When a QM accesses sensitive
information, taint from data sources (e.g., a photo taken by a camera) is tracked, and the data is
passed to the sandboxed QM in the form of labeled and immutable data references called opaque
handles. Opaque handles can be dereferenced in a QM and transmitted out with a trusted sink
API. The data sent through a sink must satisfy a flow policy such as <camera, http> defined in an
app’s manifest file. In contrast, Saint uses inter- and intra- data flow analysis on IoT apps to find
sensitive data flows by tracking information flow from sensitive sources to external sinks. Saint’s
data flow analysis uses the app’s IR. The IR models the app’s lifecycle including entry points of an
app, devices, user inputs, and call graphs. By leveraging this IR, Saint prunes infeasible paths via
path- and context-sensitivity through a work-list based dependency algorithm.
The other difference between FlowFence and Saint is the implicit flows. The use of QMs in
FlowFence eliminates the complexity of handling the implicit flows because non-sensitive code
cannot evaluate the value of an opaque handle (return value from a QM) unless it passes to a QM.
In contrast, Saint tracks implicit flow by checking the condition of a conditional branch and sees
whether it depends on a tainted value. If so, it taints all elements in the conditional branch.
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FlowFence and Saint also differ in addressing IoT-specific issues. Saint addresses SmartThings
idiosyncrasies through on-demand algorithms for precision. Yet, for a call by reflection, Saint adds
all methods in an app as possible call targets as a safe over-approximation. This increases the number
of methods to be analyzed and may lead to over-tainting. FlowFence incurs over-tainting when an
app is not accurately separated into QMs. The modulation depends on how a developer structures
their data flow controls and IoT-specific mechanisms such as call by reflection. For instance, a
developer that does not split an app into the least privilege QMs might cause over-tainting because
the analysis does not limit QMs to the code blocks that only process the sensitive data. Another
point worth to mention is that FlowFence can track sensitive data flows in multiple IoT apps by
enforcing information flow policies between the IoT apps; however, Saint detects sensitive data
flows within an individual app.
Lastly, FlowFence’s taint tracking requires platform and app developers invest significant efforts
towards extending their software to support information flow control, yet Saint automates infor-
mation flow tracking through backward taint analysis. Both systems require users to make security
decisions. FlowFence prompts users for confirmation with taint sources and sinks that indicate how
an app will use sensitive data. This may cause frequent flow-prompts to request user permission if
publisher policies do not match with the policies. In contrast, Saint presents users with a warning
report at install time. The report contains the full data flow paths between taint sources and sinks
including the taint labels and taint sink information such as hostname and contact information.
6.3.2 Systems for Safety and Security. We study SmartAuth, ContexIoT, ProvThings and Soteria
systems designed for safety and security. While these systems differ in analysis precision, runtime
and scope, all systems must be responsive to program-analysis issues.
All systems perform analysis on the AST of app source code. In detail, ContexIoT, and ProvThings
add instrumentation code to the app source code. Using instrumented code, ContexIoT determines
the app functionality under a particular context, ProvThings logs app information for attack
investigation and system diagnosis. We note that even though ContexIoT and ProvThings are
dynamic systems, they use static analysis to determine where to insert code for obtaining the
runtime behavior of apps. Soteria is a static analysis system that extracts a state-model from an app’s
source code to verify security and safety properties through a model checker. Lastly, SmartAuth
performs static analysis to generate an authorization interface for users. SmartAuth complements
static analysis with Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to capture the differences
between an app’s actual functionality and the functionality a developer defines. NLP techniques
are mainly used to gather data from developer-defined device code annotations and user inputs.
For example, the device location is extracted from the device code block, and the app definition
is obtained from the definition block of an app’s source code. However, the application of NLP
techniques might preclude the precise analysis of many practical scenarios. For instance, an app
may have incorrect or incomplete device annotations, and some IoT platforms (e.g., OpenHAB [42])
do not require an app definition block that can be analyzed.
Systems implement different algorithms for analysis sensitivities depending on their goals. To
obtain numerical-valued device attributes through provenance collection, ContexIoT implements
taint analysis to find dependencies between numerical attributes. ProvThings computes a backward
slice from a numerical-valued attribute as slicing criteria, and Soteria uses dependence analysis
to identify a set of possible sources that a numerical-valued attribute can take. To obtain the
predicates that guard device actions, ContexIoT gathers the value of the variables on which a device
attribute is control-dependent. Soteria uses forward symbolic execution to perform path exploration
on source code and accumulates path conditions during exploration. Systems, excluding Soteria,
do not track the sources of the values in predicates that show whether a value is defined by a
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user, hard-coded by the developer, or that user input is modified by the developer. We note that
labeling numerical-valued attributes and components in predicates may provide the user with more
information for context identification and forensic analysis. For path-sensitivity, Soteria prunes
infeasible paths by collecting the predicates at conditional branches and checking whether the
conjunction of those predicates is always false. For context-sensitivity, Soteria throws away paths
that do not match function calls and returns using depth-one call-site sensitivity. We note that
while path- and context-sensitivity is not an issue in ContexIoT and ProvThings, they may add
additional instrumented code for provenance and context collection to the infeasible paths.
Systems also differ in handling IoT-specific issues. First, ContexIoT and SmartAuth analyze IoT
apps in isolation—collecting context of an individual app; ProvThings and Soteria, however, capture
interactions among apps. ProvThings supports this capability by analyzing provenance graphs of
multiple apps, and Soteria constructs a union state-model which represents the unified behavior of
apps when they are installed together. Second, systems address SmartThings-specific idiosyncrasies
of Restful APIs, closures, and call by reflection in different ways. ContexIoT, ProvThings, and Soteria
implement on-demand algorithms for idiosyncrasies; yet systems differ in handling call by reflection.
Soteria constructs a call graph by adding all methods as possible call targets of a reflective call and
may overapproximate the safety and security violations. ProvThings and ContexIoT instrument all
reflective calls, and may perform more instrumentation than needed.
Lastly, some IoT systems require users to make decisions. ContexIoT asks for a user approval
of a context through run-time prompts before an action is executed. SmartAuth eliminates this
limitation by presenting an authorization interface to users at install time. ProvThings requires
users to investigate the provenance graphs and create policies. Soteria defines a set of safety and
security properties property through requirements engineering.
7 TAKEAWAYS AND CONCLUSIONS
The security and privacy of IoT is a new and emergent area. This work attempts to study IoT
application security and privacy research through program-analysis techniques. We began by
surveying five major IoT programming platforms to gain insights into the structure of their apps
and map their app structures into common building blocks. By studying these IoT platforms,
we have distilled the key aspects of program analysis under IoT-specific analysis issues, IoT app
idiosyncrasies, and analysis sensitivities. Lastly, we have explored IoT app analysis academic
papers over the past two years that employ program-analysis techniques for security and privacy
issues. Broadly speaking, most attempts to date focus on issues such as sensitive data leaks, abuse
prevention, permission misuse, and provenance collection. Our study yields a natural structure
for reasoning about the capacity of the IoT systems and reveals the extent to which each system
identifies and mitigates safety, security and privacy issues.
Our key findings through these explorations include: (1) The dominant IoT programming plat-
forms structure their apps around a sensor-computation-actuator idiom, (2) a suite of analysis
tools and algorithms targeted at diverse IoT platforms is at this time largely absent, (3) because
IoT applications control physical processes through devices, the security and privacy issues are
more subtle and difficult to identify, (4) most approaches lack multiple analysis sensitivities such
as path- and context-sensitivity, (5) most approaches often do not consider security and safety
problems in multi-app environments and through information flows in trigger-action platforms, (6)
members of the research community often use the SmartThings platform to evaluate their tools
as numerous open-source official and third-party apps are available, and (7) IoT systems often
implement algorithms on the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of a SmartThings app because of the
constraints on Groovy language and proprietary back-end libraries.
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While the research community has been effective in providing tools that identify security and
privacy issues in specific IoT implementations, many areas remain open problems, and IoT program
analysis needs additional progress before apps are safe for broader use. First, IoT analysis systems
that use program analysis techniques for security and privacy often focus on smart homes. Yet,
IoT applications are diverse in terms of type and the number of connected devices. Therefore, the
analysis must be responsive to the unique characteristics and constraints of different IoT domains.
Second, current IoT analysis systems may possess scalability problem oft-encountered in formal
program analysis in systems such as smart automobiles and industrial IoT, which have a large
amount of code for analysis. The research community must consider the practicality of their
approaches in IoT systems where large-scale programs are developed and updated on a regular
basis. Third, physical processes in IoT can have effects on critical infrastructure. For instance, IoT
devices are able to change power demand in critical infrastructure, accelerate a motor to a velocity,
and decrease water usage in an industrial system. This inter-tangled environment expands security
issues through subtle interactions between IoT systems and other environments. Therefore, the
interactions between systems must be carefully studied to uncover potential security issues. Fourth,
analysis systems often do not assess the impact of approaches on the system resources. Thus,
existing IoT solutions may incur high computational cost and energy consumption which might
be infeasible for real systems. For instance, an IoT analysis system may need to poll sensor data
periodically to obtain device states. The polling could consume sensor battery when the intervals
are too short or may limit real-time detection when the intervals are too long. Program analysis and
statistical modeling techniques can be combined to create efficient methods to reduce the energy
consumption of devices. Lastly, approaches need to consider taking the right course of action when
a security and safety violation happens. Simply blocking a device state or asking a user for approval
through runtime prompts could be dangerous. For example, door-unlock action in an app that
unlocks the door when there is smoke in the house may not be permitted by the policy or may
be asked a user to approve the action. However, dropping the action or no response from a user
will result in a locked door, which is potentially unsafe depending on the circumstances. To help
keep the IoT environment stable when a violation is detected, several response disciplines can be
implemented to preserve the integrity of the environment.
We envision these explorations to be a central pillar for applying program-analysis techniques
to IoT, and providing researchers with insights useful for future work.
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